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Abstract 
Tax evasion in Pakistan is very high that has led to deteriorated economic situation and lack 
of public service delivery. The paper analyzes four variables of tax morale - feelings of guilt and 
shame; lack of trust on government; perception about others citizens paying taxes; and level of pe-
nalties - as determinants of tax evasion in Pakistan. The paper includes survey carried out through a 
questionnaire distributed among carefully selected sample of 400 salaried employees to gather res-
ponses that were analyzed using t-test. The findings suggest that perception about utilization of 
money, elements of shame, perception about other citizens’ compliance behavior and level of penal-
ties affect tax evasion. However, variables of guilt and perception about corruption do not have sig-
nificant impact on evasion behavior. Some policy interventions have been suggested to curb the me-
nace of evasion at the end of the paper. These policies include motivating taxpayers through me-
thods like hypothecation, imposition of fines and penalties and publishing names of defaulters 
through media and tax department website.  
Keywords: Tax evasion, Tax Morale, Taxation, Pakistan, Public Policy 
 
Introduction  
Taxes play an important role in the economic development of the country as it enables the 
government to achieve its objectives like defense, education, justice and social welfare to its citizens 
(Awan & Hannan, 2014). Taxes also enable the government to save itself from foreign dependence 
and to support its industry by taxing imports.  The importance of taxes in countries like Pakistan is 
immense as more than ninety percent of the revenue generated is through taxation. According to the 
Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, the tax structure of Pakistan is divided into two broad 
categories:  
1. Direct Taxes 
These taxes are further divided into: 
a. Income Tax 
b. Workers Welfare Fund  
c. Capital Value Tax 
2. Indirect Taxes 
a. Sales Tax 
b. Customs Duty 
c. Federal Excise Duty 
The Constitution of Pakistan states that Pakistan is a federation with four provinces. The 
Federal Government generates ninety-five percent of the total taxes while the provincial share is just 
five percent in the total revenue collection. The Federal share is further divided among the provinces 
according to certain criteria as given in the Article 160(1) of the Constitution of the country.  
Pakistan is a country that has a Tax to GDP ratio of just 13% which is the lowest in emerging 
economies (SDPI, 2013). Pakistan has been facing the dilemma of poor tax collection. A study car-
ried out by the World Bank in 2009 claimed that the tax gap of the country was 79%, terming it as 
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one of the lowest in the world (World Bank, 2009). IMF in its report1 in 2015 claimed that Pakis-
tan’s Tax to GDP ratio was only 11% while only 16% of the potential taxpayers were included in 
the tax base of the country. The consequences of such poor collection are many folds. First of all 
this reduces revenue collection as the government in order to enhance revenues has to go for more 
indirect taxation that is regressive in nature (Zafar, 2017). This situation in turn increases overall 
prices in the country and the general public suffers as a result.  
One of the main reasons for poor tax collection in Pakistan is Tax evasion. Tax evasion is a 
formal expression for pilferage of taxation and includes all those activities of hiding incomes or 
overstating expenses that lead to deprivation of the authorities from tax revenue (Azhar, 1996). It is 
different from tax avoidance in the sense that avoidance involves legal ways to reduce the tax bur-
den (p. 657). The issue of tax evasion is not new for Pakistan. Tax evasion and underground econo-
my existed in the country even in the 1960s (Aslam, 1998). Nevertheless the situation worsened as 
time passed.  
Tax evasion in the country increased with time. According to estimates, the total tax evasion 
in Pakistan was PkR 1.5 billion in 1973 that increased to PkR 152 billion in the year 1996 (PIDE, 
1998). In the year 2012, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) – a watchdog for corruption in the 
country – estimated the loss of government revenue to the national exchequer at PkR 7 billion per 
day with tax evasion as one of the main causes (Dawn, 2012).  
The main purpose this paper is to find out the determinants of tax evasion in Pakistan that 
has led to such economic and social consequences for the country. The findings of the paper will be 
helpful as it will enable the government to take care of its economic situation and reduce foreign de-
pendence. Objectives of the study in this regard include: 
1. whether feeling of guilt and shame lead to tax evasion in the country 
2. whether perception about others in the society paying taxes affects tax evasion beha-
vior 
3. whether lack of trust on government leads to tax evasion  
4. whether level of penalties on evasion affect tax evasion  
 
Review of Literature 
Literature has provided different meanings and definitions of tax evasion. According to 
(Chiumya, 2006) tax evasion refers to the concealment of incomes and profits; overstating expendi-
tures; and misreporting sources of incomes. (Akram, Ilyas, & Mobin, 2017) claims that tax evasion 
is considered a criminal action and a violation of law as it involves willful concealment of facts re-
lated to income earned through legal sources (Ghafoor & hannan, 2014) terms tax evasion as a glob-
al phenomenon that prevails everywhere irrespective of religion or customs and it goes hand in hand 
with taxation process.  
Others have termed lack of trust on government as well as the state institutions and the utili-
zation of their tax money by the political and bureaucratic elite  as a determining factor of tax eva-
sion (Saeed 2004), (Sam 2010) and Torgler (2003)  while (Ajaz & Ahmed, 2010) and (Syadullah, 
2015) termed corruption, poor governance and political instability to be responsible for giving birth 
to tax evasion behavior among the individuals. While literature also claims that people adhere to tax 
evasion habits if they consider that the services being provided to them are not sufficient or the 
masses are being deprived of their right and access to public services (Kemal, 2006). 
 
                                                 
1 IMF ninth Review Report (IMF Country Report No 16/1) 
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Higher tax rates and unfair tax system are also a point of concern as far as relationship to tax 
evasion is concerned. Much scholarly work has identified a positive relationship between higher tax 
rates and unfair tax system with tax evasion in the economy. According to (wadhwa & Pal, 2002) 
higher tax rates and multiple taxes imposed on a lower tax base has been a determining factor of 
poor tax collection. (Khan & Ahmed, 2014) claimed that when the tax rates are higher and people 
perceive that the benefits in return of the taxes being paid are not as much, they avoid paying taxes 
and hence evade taxes. The higher rate of direct taxes in the economy leads to underground or in-
formal economy as people go for informal and undocumented transactions to avoid their income be-
ing taxed by the authorities Salman Aslam (1998). 
Certain personal characteristics have been identified as the determinants of tax evasion. Ac-
cording to (Slemrod, 2007) male persons who are married evade more as compared to females and 
people who are unmarried while young people evade more than elderly people. (Richardson, 2006) 
pointed out gender, age, educational status and income source – among other variables – as contri-
buting factors or determinants of tax evasion which have a significant relationship with tax evasion.  
Literature has also pointed out other variables that contribute to tax evasion. an important de-
terminant that leads to tax evasion included fear of punishment and penalties on tax evasion and had 
a direct and position relationship (Sandmo 2004). Accroding to some scholars, people evade taxes if 
they consider that other people are also doing the same Eric M. Uslaner (2003). People evade their 
share of taxes whenever they perceive that such a practice is being carried out by people in their vi-
cinity or even if they believe such practice is going on in the country as a whole (Hanousek & Palda, 
2004). 
Tax evasion is a global phenomenon has been in the world and Pakistan is not an exception 
to it. Literature suggests that corruption, lack of trade openness, low per capita income and lack of 
political stability as some of the causes of poor tax collection in the country (Amin, Nadim, Perveen, 
Kamran, & Anwar, 2014). Others also suggest that the main causes of poor tax collection in Pakis-
tan include meager tax base, dependence on sectors exempted from taxation (the agriculture sector), 
lack of knowledge about tax system and foreign aid (Chaudhry & Munir, Dec 2010). 
Some scholars are of the view that political elite are the main cause of injecting tax evasion 
behavior among the masses. According to (Bukhari & Haq, 2014) the tax authorities are not empo-
wered to enforce their powers on the rich and the elite class of the country who run away by making 
use of their own political and economic powers. Moreover this elite class joins hands in their de-
signs and enjoy amenities and perks on public money. A study carried out on the parliamentarians of 
the country claimed that only two percent of them had their NTN (National Tax Numbers) while 
only one-tenth of them actually paid their taxes (CPDI & CIRP , 2011). 
Much literature has stressed upon unfair and higher tax rates, regressive tax system, poor 
administration, corruption and lack of trust on government as the main causes of tax evasion in Pa-
kistan (Awan & Hannan, Oct 2014) and (Khan & Ahmed, 2014). As a result of higher tax rates and 
huge costs of compliance, individuals indulge themselves in underground activities and hence the 
government is deprived of revenue generation (Feltenstein & Cyan, 2013).  
In turn the government, in order to generate more revenue, goes for inefficient tax schemes 
that further leads to evasion and the vicious cycle continues (Best, Brockmeyer, Kleven, Spinnewijn, 
& Waseem, 2015). Moreover, (Awan & Hannan, Oct 2014) highlighted complexity in tax system; 
unproductive expenditures; corruption in tax administration and misuse of tax money as some of the 
determinants that led to an anti-tax culture in Pakistan.  
As evident from the literature, at global level, much emphasis has been laid on the personal 
characteristics of the taxpayers and tax morale and their relationship with tax evasion. studies car-
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ried out by (Recardson, 2006), (Recardson, 2008), all have stressed upon the behavioral aspects i.e; 
they all have related tax evasion with personal characteristics including age, gender, marital status, 
education and even source of income. Some studies like that carried out by (Philip & Palda, 2004) 
have went to the extent of carrying out surveys to find out behavioral responses along with their per-
ceptions and personal characteristic to measure the relationship with tax evasion. Moreover, these 
studies have included tax morale and its relationship with tax evasion.  
However, in case of Pakistan studies have considered macroeconomic variables and second-
ary data for the calculation of tax evasion in the country. There are some studies that have consi-
dered some micro economic variables and behavioral responses of respondents through surveys, like 
the one carried out by (Ghafoor & Hannan, 2014). However, such studies have also remained con-
fined to asking questions regarding political views and have completely ignored the relationship cer-
tain personal characteristics and other behavioral responses of tax payers with tax evasion patterns 
of individuals.  
The current study includes circulating a questionnaire to gather hands on information direct-
ly from the taxpayers. In this way, certain indicators for tax morale have been extracted. Using spe-
cial econometric techniques, the relationship of these indicators with tax evasion has been estab-
lished. This study will be helpful for the policy makers and legislators to enact laws so that they are 
able to enhance tax collection and reap the benefits of higher revenue generation that can then be 
spent on the welfare of the citizens and the government of the country can fulfill its obligations and 
provision of public services to the masses in an effective and an efficient manner.  
 
Methodology 
The paper contains cross sectional survey study in which primary data has been gathered by 
distributing structured questionnaire to selected respondents and their responses had been taken on 
the variables of interest. The population of the research includes salaried class individuals from the 
twin cities i.e; Rawalpindi and Islamabad region. The main rationale to consider the salaried class in 
the study is the fact that mostly salaried class individuals are exposed to third party reporting hence 
reducing their chances of being out of tax net. Moreover, it is obligatory as per the Income Tax Or-
dinance 2001 to deduct tax at source (FBR, 2013). This makes these salaried personnel de-facto tax-
payers.  
A total of 400 respondents were approached for the purpose of the study. The respondents 
were selected through Stratified Random Sampling in which the population was first stratified into 
four sectors and then fifty respondents from each sector in each city had been selected for the sur-
vey. The sectors included Private, Public, NGO as well as the Education Sector including teaching 
and administrative staff of universities only. 
The survey instrument included a 5-point likert scale questionnaire in which certain ques-
tions had been asked from the respondents in order to measure the effect of tax morale on tax eva-
sion as perceived by the respondents. According to (Luttmer & Singhal, 2014) tax morale includes: 
1. Concern about guilt and shame in non-payment of taxes 
2. Concern about services being provided by the state  
3. Concern about others paying their share of taxes 
4. Perceived penalties and punishments on Tax evasion 
The data gathered through survey had then been inserted into SPSS v 18 for the analysis 
stage. The analysis stage included taking frequencies, percentages and Mean to study the trend of 
responses. In the second stage “One Sample t-Test” had been taken to measure the mean difference 
from the Test Value and hence categorizing the variables in order of importance for the dependent 
variable. Conbrach’s Alpha was also used to check the reliability of the data collected. The same 
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data had then been analyzed through analysis techniques as mentioned above and was then com-
pared with the information obtained from journals articles, books and even newspaper articles.  
 
Results and Discussion 
1. Perceived Shame and Guilt 
Shame refers to an emotion in which a person feels degraded or embaraced when his act of 
wrongdoing is exposed whereas guilt is the feeling of repent one feels after one becomes of the 
wrongdoing for which he or she think is responsible for (Markel, 2001 , P. 2179). Sentiments of 
guilt and shame do change the tax compliance behavior of the individuals (Erard and Feinstein 
1994). Whenever an individual evaluates his choice of tax evasion the factor of shame is considered 
while doing the cost and benefit analysis (Kirchler, 2007) as shame and moral costs are positively 
correlated with the tax compliance of an individual (Dulleck et all., 2016).  
For the purpose of the study, two indicators for guilt and two for shame had been taken dur-
ing the course of survey. The indicators for shame included “do you fear that your name will be in-
cluded in the defaulters’ list by FBR” (DEFLST) and “do you think someone else will report if you 
evade your share of taxes” (OTHREP) while those for guilt included “do you think others will have 
to pay for the amount that you evade” (OTHRPY) and “do you think evading taxes is the Right 
thing to do”(RGHTHG). The results of the survey for shame and guilt are appended in Table 1. The 
table includes responses of the respondents for the questions regarding shame and guilt. The ques-
tion-wise detail of variables is appended as under: 
 
Table 1: Summary of Elements of Shame and Guilt 
Variable Indicator Responses TOTAL
 Strongly  
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
Shame DEFLST 56 73 94 48 54 6 331 
OTHREP 38 72 101 45 48 25 329 
Guilt OTHRPY 48 66 92 46 52 25 329 
RGHTHG 159 102 46 12 11 4 334 
 
Indicators for Shame  
As a proxy for shame, the respondents were asked to give their opinion regarding acceptabil-
ity of their name being published in the defaulters’ list on the Federal Board of Revenue website. 
The answer was required on a 5 point likert scale with 5 as highly acceptable and 1 being not-at-all 
acceptable. A majority of 39% respondents were on the acceptability side of the table while only 
30.8% had opinions discouraging the act. Most of the respondents making 28.4% or 94 out of the 
total sample size selected option 3 meaning that they showed neutrality to the question. The mean of 
3.0 also proves the same. The response to the question is given in Table 2. 
Similarly the second question of whether it was acceptable for the respondent that someone 
else reports his tax evasion also produced similar results. A vast majority of 30.7% or 101 respon-
dents selected option 3 thus remained neutral while the responses remained skewed in favor of the 
question asked. A mean score of 2.8 also showed that the respondents were neutral to the second 
question as well.  
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Table 1 : Fear of name in Defaulters’ List 
S No. Indicator Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
1. Do u fear that your name 
will be included in the de-
faulters’ list for non-
payment of taxes? 
(DEFLST) 
5 56 16.9 3.0 
4 73 22.1 
3 94 28.4 
2 48 14.5 
1 54 16.3 
Don’t know 06 1.8 
Total 331 100 
 
This peculiar trend of neutrality can be attributable to the fact that hones responses to the is-
sues like tax evasion are difficult to be obtained. People usually try to hide their actual responses 
and give responses that are biased. (Schneider, 2003). However, the survey indicates that people did 
not even accept the factor of shame (as determined by the responses of the two questions asked). It 
is also pertinent to mention here that Pakistan has a very low tax to GDP ratio of just 12.4% of GDP 
while the tax gap stands at 9.8% making a total of PkR. 3.2 trillion (Hassan, 2018). This shows a 
high culture of tax evasion in the country. Moreover, the findings are also in conformity with (John 
Cullis, 2012)and (Alm, 2012) who state that individual behavior of tax compliance are shaped by the 
social norms prevailing in the society. 
 
Table 2 : Fear of Someone reports Evasion 
S No. Indicator Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
2. Do you consider it accept-
able if someone reports 
your tax evasion to the au-
thorities? 
(OTHREP) 
5 38 11.5 2.8 
4 72 21.9 
3 101 30.7 
2 45 13.7 
1 48 14.6 
Don’t know 25 7.6 
Total 329 100 
 
 Indicators for Guilt 
The other variable of ‘Guilt’ was also measured with the help of two indicators namely; is it 
acceptable that other pay your share of taxes if you evade? and is it the right thing to evade taxes? 
The responses to the two questions are appended below in Table 4: 
 
Table 4: Fear of Someone reports Evasion 
S No. Indicator Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
1. In your opinion, is it accept-
able that someone else bears 
the burden of tax evasion on 
your part? 
(OTHRPY) 
5 81 24.7 2.4 
4 76 23.2 
3 62 18.9 
2 48 14.6 
1 36 11.0 
Don’t know 25 7.6 
Total 328 100 
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It is evident from the table above that an absolute majority of respondents fall in the disa-
greement range of the scale. According to the figures, a total of 24.7% strongly disagreed while 
another 23.2% disagreed to the statement of whether it was acceptable to transfer their burden of tax 
to others by the way of evading taxes. The percentage of respondents falls as the table moves from 
disagreement towards the agreement side. This is evident from the fact that only 7.6% strongly 
agreed to the statement. Although the mean of 2.4 falls somewhat near to the neutral side, still it 
shows an inclination towards the disagreement side of the table.  
The second and somewhat a more direct indicator for guilt had a stronger trend towards the 
disagreement side. Almost half of the respondents making almost 48% of the respondents strongly 
disagreed to the statement of whether it was the right thing to evade taxes while another 30.6% fair-
ly disagreed to the statement. Only around 20% of the respondents were on the rest three points on 
the likert scale. A stronger skewness is shown by the mean of 1.8, hence rejecting the statement al-
together. The responses to the questions regarding guilt are appended in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Table 5: Indicators of Guilt 
S No. Indicator Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
2.  
 
 
Do you think it is the right 
thing to evade taxes? 
(RGHTHG) 
5 11 3.3  
 
 
 
1.8 
4 12 3.6 
3 46 13.8 
2 102 30.5 
1 159 47.6 
Don’t know 4 1.2 
Total 334 100 
 
There is a decreasing trend as we move towards acceptability side on both the indicators as 
shown in Table 5 above. The result is in consistence with a study carried out by (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994) that states that when people believe that their actions will over bur-
den others or when they think that the actions would be looked down upon by others, people try to 
alter their behavior that will be in line with what they think is accepted by others (p. 247).  
Moreover, literature also suggests that religion also has an impact on the tax evasion beha-
vior of individuals (Murtuza & Ghazanfar, 1998) and (McGee, 1997) have established a relationship 
between the ethics of tax evasion and Islam and have claimed that Islam teaches to be law abiding 
citizens and follow rule of the land. However, according to (Bank, Mcgee, & Yüzbaşı, 2015) Mus-
lims are to strictly abide by the tax laws when the state is following the Shariah Law.  
In case of Pakistan, the constitution states that Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and all laws 
will be made in the light of Shariah, therefore, following tax laws in Pakistan is the responsibility of 
every citizen of the country.  
2. Trust in Government  
Trust is the expectation that other person’s behavior will not affect the interests of oneself 
negatively (Paxton & Smith, 2008). Trust in this research refers to the response of individuals’ tax 
evasion behavior to the perception of services being provided by the state. Trust in government has a 
direct link with compliance behaviors of the citizens including their decisions to comply with tax 
regulations (Levi & Stoker, 2000). If the taxpayers have trust in the government and they perceive 
the government to be working in their interest, they will go for tax compliance even if evasion has 
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been a better option for them (Levi, 1998). According to (Alm & Togler, 2004) there is a positive 
relationship between trust in government and the parliament and the tax compliance behavior of the 
individuals. This means that cheating government especially through tax evasion is found to be less 
justifiable in countries where level of trust in government is higher and vice versa.  
For the purpose of measuring trust in government, two indicators have been taken first being 
satisfaction with the services being provided by the government. The question asked in this regard-
ing states do you think taxes paid are being utilized for providing adequate services by the govern-
ment to its citizens? Second indicator to measure trust included asking respondents regarding their 
perception of corruption. The question asked was to what extent do you think your tax money is be-
ing used to fill pockets of politicians and officials? The responses are presented in the Tables 6 and 
7. 
 
Table 6: Perception about utilization of tax money 
S No Indicator Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
1. Do you think that tax eva-
sion is more when people 
perceive taxes paid are 
NOT being utilized to 
provide for the required 
public services for the citi-
zens? 
Strongly agree 8 2.5  
 
 
 
4.12 
Agree 23 7.1 
Neutral 34 10.5 
Disagree 105 32.4 
Strongly Disagree 152 46.9 
Don’t know 2 0.6 
TOTAL 324 100 
 
Table 7: Perception about corruption  
S No Indicator  Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
1. Do you agree that that 
people don’t pay taxes 
because the tax money is 
being used to fill up the 
pockets of politicians and 
officials? 
Strongly agree 209 62.6  
 
 
1.5 
Agree 85 25.4 
Neutral 26 7.8 
Disagree 5 1.5 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.1 
Don’t know 2 0.6 
TOTAL 334 100 
 
The above table shows an increasing trend while moving towards disagreement side of the 
statement. Almost half of the sample size of 46.9% strongly disagreed to the statement that their tax 
money was being utilized for the public services being provided by the government. The mean of 
4.12 rejects the statement about provision of public services by the government.  
The second indicator has produced the same results. An absolute majority of 62.6% strongly 
agreed to the statement while around a quarter agreed but to a lesser extent. The mean of 1.5 shows 
that the response pattern is skewed towards agreement side hence the response trend accepts the 
statement. The findings are in line with the fact that when there is a large possibility of politicians 
and public servants eating away public money for their own vested interests, there is less left to 
spend on public services that results in the inclination of citizens more towards tax evasion (Litinaa 
& Palivos, 2015).  
In Pakistan corruption is on the rise. According to Transparency International, Pakistan 
ranked 117 in Corruption Perception Index with the index of 32 in two consecutive years of 2016 
and 2017. The corruption  in Pakistan is so much that the sitting Prime Minister of the country was 
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charged with corruption and removed from office in 2017 after accusations being proven on him and 
his close allies. This led to an increased perception about corruption in minds of the citizens that de-
creased the level of trust for the government in the minds of the masses. Moreover there has been an 
increasing gap in the government and citizens of the country as far as public service delivery is con-
cerned. According to a report published by Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) in 2017, there 
is much gap between the requirement and provision of public services in the country especially to 
the poor population away from the main cities (Naveed, 2017).  
3. Perception about others paying taxes  
Social norms and culture have an impact on the tax evasion habits of its citizens (Cullis, 
Joanes & Slovioa, 2012). Individuals comply with the rules when they are aware that compliance is 
a social norm (Alm, 2012). When a person observes unethical behavior in his or her vicinity, ones 
perception about the social norms regarding honesty and ethics change (Gino, Ayal and Arely, 
2009). Literature shows that the taxpayers conditionally comply with the rules (eg; tax rules) till the 
time others in the society are doing the same (Fray & Torgler, 2007 and Traxler, 2010). Therefore, 
perception about the tax compliance behavior in the social circle has a direct impact on the tax com-
pliance behavior of an individual.  
In order to measure the impact of perception about others paying their share of taxes on tax 
evasion, the question asked included ‘in your opinion, do you think other people in your neighbor-
hood are paying taxes honestly?’ The answer to the question is appended in Table 8. As evident 
from the tabulated figures, most respondents are in the neutral to fairly agree region of the scale. 
According to the statistics, 30% of the respondents remained neutral to the statement while 26.4% 
fairly agreed to the statement. The mean score of 2.7 also indicates the same region of acceptability 
of the statement. Hence the statement is not strongly supported by the survey.  
 
Table 8 : Perception about others evading taxes 
S No Indicator Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
1. Do you think tax evasion 
increases when others in 
your neighborhood are 
evading their taxes? 
Strongly Agree 45 13.6   
 
 
 
2.7 
Agree 87 26.4 
Neutral 99 30.0 
Disagree 36 10.9 
Strongly Disagree 47 14.2 
Don’t Know 16 4.8 
TOTAL 330 100 
 
Table 9 : Perception about level of Penalties 
 
S No 
Indicator Response Frequency Percentage Mean 
1. Do you think penalties are 
adequate enough on tax 
evasion in the country?  
Strongly Agree 66 19.8  
 
 
2.52 
Agree 102 30.5 
Neutral 80 24.0 
Disagree 37 11.1 
Strongly Disagree 37 11.1 
Don’t Know 12 3.6 
TOTAL 334 100 
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4. Penalties on of Tax Evasion 
Penalties and fines have shown to have a significant impact on tax compliance behaviors. 
However, large fine on tax evasion has shown to be more detrimental for tax compliance as com-
pared to large probability of being caught (Christiansen, 1980) and (Nourzad & Crane, 1986). How-
ever a study by (Obid, 2004) concluded that audit probability and penalties have significant effect 
on the tax compliance behavior of individuals till the time effective tools are used by the govern-
ment. Although penalties and probability of being caught help shape compliance behavior of indi-
viduals, these effects vary based on demographic factors like gender, age and even occupational sta-
tus of the taxpayer (Devos, 2008). The present survey also checked the impact of perceived penalties 
on tax evasion behavior of individuals. The results are shown in Table 9.  
The response indicates that the majority of individuals agreed to the statement that penalties 
were adequately enough on tax evaders. A total of 102 respondents making 30.5% agreed while 
19.8% strongly agreed to the statement making a total of almost 50% or half of the sample size on 
the agreement side of the table. Disagreement was only 22.2% of the total response rate while 24% 
remained neutral. The mean figure of 2.5 shows an inclination towards disagreement (although not 
strongly agreeing) side.  
According to Section 183 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 20012 penalty for income tax de-
fault is 5% in first default, additional twenty percent in the second, additional twenty five percent in 
the third and fifty percent in the fourth time on the amount of tax evaded. However, the penalty can-
not go above 100% of the total amount. This situation when compared to the neighboring India is a 
bit change as the penalty for non- payment of taxes can lead up to 300% of the tax evaded3. In USA, 
the IRS fines up to 25% on tax evaded per month.  
Having viewed the penalty situation of the two countries, the comparison shows that the pe-
nalty on tax evasion in Pakistan is high but not to that extent. Coincidently, the results of the survey 
prove the same as most respondents were on the agreement side of the scale while not going for 
strong agreement.  
Reliability Test 
Chronbach’s Alpha Table 
Chronbach’s Alpha No of Items 
.602 8 
 
The test score of .602 shows proves the data to be reliable as anything more than 0.50 means 
that the data is reliable.  
T-Test 
T-Test statistics were also calculated to check the significance of the data. The results are ta-
bulated in Table 10. 
The results of the t-test indicated that three out of eight variables have mean values less than 
the test value of 2.5. These variables include perception about tax money being used to fill pockets 
of officials and politicians and both the variables of guilt. Moreover, perception about the level of 
penalties on tax evasion also does not bother the tax evasion behavior much. Whereas the other va-
riables including both the indicators of shame and perception about other paying honestly has more 
impact on the tax evasion behavior. Perception about utilization of tax money has the greatest im-
pact on tax evasion as seen from Table 10. It is pertinent to mention here that all results are signifi-
cant at 1% level of significance.  
                                                 
2 Income Tax Ordinance 2001 amended by Finance Bill 2013 
3 Section 261(c) of Income Tax Act of India 
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Table 10: T-Test 
Variable Test Value = 2.5 
t-value Mean P-Value Mean Difference 
Utilization of money -20.077 4.12 0.000 1.62 
Filling pockets  -30.752 1.50 0.000 -1 
Name in defaulter list -1.903 3.00 0.000 0.5 
Someone will report -3.174 2.80 0.000 0.3 
Others paying honestly -3.848 2.70 0.000 0.2 
Doing RIGHT THINGS -21.070 1.80 0.000 -0.7 
Others will pay more -3.251 2.40 0.001 -0.1 
Penalty on evasion -6.574 2.50 0.000 0.00 
All values are significant at 1% level of significant 
 
Political Intervention for Tax compliance 
Despite the fact that much work has been carried out in the field of tax evasion and com-
pliance, less contribution has been made in the literature focusing on the role of politics in shaping 
compliance behavior of individuals. However, literature related to Public Choice has touched upon 
the issue of contribution of politicians and the ruling class in shaping and controlling the economy 
(Ben-Porath, 1975), (MacCraken, 1977), and (Tufte, 1978). A study carried out by (MacRae, 1977) 
concluded that politicians have a role in shaping citizen behavior as a tool to get political favors by 
manipulating economic situation during election years. This model is known as election cycle model 
and is part of the Political Business Cycle theory. According to (Moore, 2015) the government tar-
gets only those segment of taxpayers whom it considers more revenue generating.  
One of the tools to affect economy by the ruling elite of the country includes influencing the 
tax administration and structure (Kim, 2008). Therefore role of politics cannot be ruled out in shap-
ing the tax evasion behavior in a society. Moreover, as seen from the above discussion, a total of 
four determinants of tax morale that proved to be significant contributors of tax evasion have been 
so far discussed in the paper and out of the four variables, three have direct relationship with the 
government that include utilization of tax money; name to be included in the defaulters’ list; and 
someone will report the income to the government. However, the fourth variable ‘others’ paying 
their share of taxes honestly’ also can be attributable to the role of government. Therefore, politics 
has an important role to play in this regard.  
The results of the survey indicate that perception about utilization of tax money plays an im-
portant role in the tax compliance behavior of the taxpayers. The government needs to focus on pro-
vision of public services to the masses in return for them to comply with the tax laws of the land. In 
order to gain trust of the governments, the taxpayers need to know where their taxes are being uti-
lized. One of the methods is hypothecation (Seely, 2011). This process involves earmarking a por-
tion of taxpayers’ money on certain projects or allows taxpayers to utilize their tax money on the 
area of their own interest (Brockmann, Genschel, & Seelkopf, 2015). One such example as quoted 
by Brockmann is of Spain where the taxpayers were allowed to utilize part of their tax money for 
charity for the church while the other example is of Japan where taxpayers are allowed to pays part 
of  income tax for the betterment of any rural area of the country.  
The other variable that has an impact on tax compliance is the element of shame. One of the 
methods to control evasion is by targeting the individuals evading taxes emotionally. A study carried 
out by (Coricelli, Joffily, Montmarquette, & Villeval, 2010) suggested that publically mentioning 
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the names of defaulter taxpayers, has a direct effect on the tax compliance behavior of individuals. 
Therefore the Federal Board of Revenue needs to public the names of tax defaulters on its website or 
though print and social media to exploit the element of shame in order to ensure tax compliance. 
However, care must be taken that the evaders should be reintegrated rather than stigmatized for a 
longer period of time because stigmatization or putting stigma on an individual for being a tax evad-
er has proven to be deteriorating for tax compliance efforts for the governments (Coricelli, Rusconi, 
& Villeval, 2014).  
It is also pertinent to mention here although penalties and fines do play role in shaping the 
compliance behavior of taxpayers but such policies do not prove to be much significant as much as 
culture (perception about others complying to tax laws) of tax compliance (Guerra & Harrington, 
2017). Although the government has the authority to impose fines and penalties, and even decide 
whether to enforce compliance through motivating by the process or rewards or by triggering the 
element of shame as mentioned In the preceding paragraphs. However, it is not possible for the gov-
ernments to enforce directly a culture of compliance. All that the government needs is to put in place 
a culture that encourages tax evasion. According to (Cummings, Martinez-Vazque, & McKee, 2001) 
the state and the tax authorities need to convince the taxpayers that the tax system is fair so that the 
compliance rate is high. The study showed that countries where the people perceive tax authorities 
to be fair, tax compliance is high, and hence due to cultural affect, more people will comply.    
 
Conclusion 
From the above discussion it can be concluded that a total of six variables had been selected 
as possible determinants of tax evasion. A questionnaire was distributed to check the perception of 
respondents about these selected variables and their perceived effect on tax evasion. The results in-
dicate that variables of guilt, corruption and perceived penalty did not have much impact on tax eva-
sion whereas variables containing utilization of tax money, shame and perception about others in the 
vicinity paying their taxes had much impact on tax evasion respectively. In view of the survey it is 
recommended that the policy makers and tax authorities have to focus very much on making people 
realize that their taxes are being utilized in an efficient and an effective manner. Political interven-
tion in this regard has been suggested in the paper. Some efforts in this regard include earmarking 
portion of tax for some specific cause and even to go to the area of choice of the taxpayer. Moreo-
ver, publishing names of defaulting taxpayers will also improve tax compliance. Similarly creating 
an environment of compliance by the government will also encourage people to comply with the tax 
laws. This in turn would create a culture of tax compliance and people will comply more due to the 
cultural affects.  
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